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Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics
†

Stefan Th. Gries ∗ & Brian G. Slocum ∗∗

This Article discusses how corpus analysis, and similar empirically
based methods of language study, can help inform judicial assessments
about language meaning. We first briefly outline our view of legal
language and interpretation in order to underscore the importance of
the ordinary meaning doctrine, and thus the relevance of tools such as
corpus analysis, to legal interpretation. Despite the heterogeneity of the
judicial interpretive process, and the importance of the specific context
relevant to the statute at issue, conventions of meaning that cut across
contexts are a necessary aspect of legal interpretation. Because ordinary
meaning must in some sense be generalizable across contexts, it would
seem to be subject in some way to the empirical verification that corpus
analysis can provide.
We demonstrate the potential of corpus analysis through the study of
two rather infamous cases in which the reviewing courts made various
general claims about language meaning. In both cases, United States v.
Costello and Smith v. United States, the courts made statements about
language that are contradicted by corpus analysis. We also demonstrate
the potential of corpus analysis through Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park
hypothetical. A discussion of how to approach Hart’s hypothetical shows
the potential but also the complexities of the kind of linguistic analyses
required by such scenarios. Corpus linguistics can yield results that are
relevant to legal interpretation, but performing the necessary analyses is
complex and requires significant training in order to perform
competently. We conclude that while it is doubtful that judges will
themselves become proficient at corpus linguistics, they should
be receptive to the expert testimony of corpus linguists in appropriate circumstances.
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INTRODUCTION
A characteristic feature of legal texts is that they employ natural
language in order to accomplish their purposes. 1 If one assumes that
successful communication is the goal in most cases (especially where
notice is important, as with criminal statutes), then these texts
1. See generally HEIKKI E.S. MATTILA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL LINGUISTICS
(Christopher Goddard trans., 2d ed. 2013) (examining the functions and characteristics of
legal language and the terminology of law).
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should be understood by different people, including the general
public, in the same way. 2 Such a goal requires that, absent some
reason for deviation, such as words with technical or special legal
meanings, the language used in legal texts should be viewed as
corresponding with the language used in nonlegal communications. 3
Indeed, the ‘ordinary meaning’ doctrine, fundamental to legal
interpretation, reflects the presumption that legal and nonlegal
language correspond. 4 Should it follow, then, that a fluent Englishspeaking layperson is as qualified as a judge to determine the
meaning of a legal provision? Most might intuitively answer “no,”
but on what basis is a judge better qualified to determine the
meaning of English sentences? Certainly, we can expect that a judge
would understand the legal effects of a provision, and a layperson
might not, but understanding the legal effects of a provision is
distinct from an understanding of the meaning of its terms. Thus, to
borrow from a much-discussed case involving a claim of breach of
contract, understanding the meaning of sandwich, and whether the
concept normally includes within its scope burritos and tacos, is
different from understanding the legal effects of a determination that
a burrito is a sandwich. 5
Notwithstanding the difference between legal effects and
meaning (as an abstract matter, at least), legal interpretation is an
intricate process that depends crucially on the context surrounding a
given provision, requiring an understanding of such things as
precedent, related provisions, interpretive rules specific to law, and

2. See Herman Cappelen, Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues, in CONTEXT
SENSITIVITY AND SEMANTIC MINIMALISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS, 3,
17 (Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter eds., 2007) (“When we articulate rules, directives, laws and
other action-guiding instructions, we assume that people, variously situated, can grasp that
content in the same way.”).
3. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963).
4. We are using double quotes for quotations, single quotes for meanings and
concepts, and italics for mentions of words as exemplified in the following sentence: The word
run can mean ‘to go faster than a walk.’
5. This question arose under a contract between a Panera Bread restaurant and a
shopping center that prohibited the shopping center from leasing space to any restaurant
“reasonably expected to have annual sales of sandwiches” exceeding ten percent of the
restaurant’s income. White City Shopping Ctr., LP v. PR Rests., LLP, No. 2006196313, 2006
WL 3292641, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006).
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the legal effects of any potential interpretation. 6 This knowledge—
not normally possessed by a layperson—helps to distinguish legal
interpretation from other kinds of nonlegal interpretation.
Nevertheless, pursuant to the ordinary meaning doctrine, judges
endemically make claims about language in legal texts that are
general in nature and not specific to the law. For example, the
Supreme Court has decided multiple cases requiring it to make
assertions about the meaning of use in relation to a criminal
sentencing provision that provides for an enhanced punishment if
the defendant “uses” a firearm “during and in relation to . . . [a]
drug trafficking crime.” 7 Similarly, Judge Posner, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, made general claims about the meaning of harbors
in interpreting a statute providing criminal penalties for anyone who
“conceals, harbors or shields from detection” an alien who “has
come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of
law.” 8 In fact, one of the most famous legal hypotheticals, H. L. A.
Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park scenario, illustrates the fuzziness of
natural language terms such as vehicle. 9
Legal interpretation therefore cannot be reduced to an exercise
in lexical semantics (i.e., the study of word meaning), but, at the
same time, lexical semantics and other aspects of language are
integral to legal interpretation. As such, inaccurate judicial assertions
about language, which various scholars have catalogued, sometimes
result in interpretations that might not have been selected absent
incorrect understandings of language. 10 These inaccurate assertions
are often based on faulty judicial intuitions or incorrect use of
6. For an excellent overview of legal interpretation, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2016).
7. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993), superseded by statute,
Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469; see infra Part IV (describing the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012)).
8. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1041 (7th Cir. 2012); see infra Part III
(describing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Costello, 666 F.3d 1040).
9. See infra V (discussing the no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical). The term fuzziness
is used in linguistics and philosophy of language to describe the boundaries of categories (such
as vehicle) that are “ill-defined, rather than sharp.” M. LYNNE MURPHY & ANU KOSKELA, KEY
TERMS IN SEMANTICS 72 (2010); see infra notes 172–175 and accompanying text (discussing
fuzziness in word meanings).
10. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993). For example,
the book discusses the tendency of judges to declare statutory language to be “plain” when, in
reality, it is general and vague. See id. at 99–117.
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external sources of linguistic information, such as dictionaries. 11
Recently, some scholars have advocated that courts would be better
served by engaging in corpus-linguistics analysis of relevant statutory
and constitutional texts. 12 Corpus linguistics is the study of language
based on large collections of language use stored in corpora, which
are computerized databases created for linguistic research.
Undoubtedly, corpus analysis can reveal insights about language
usage and meaning. Furthermore, the use of corpora, and similar
empirically based methods of language analysis, may help courts
make accurate assertions about the ordinary meaning of language.
This Article demonstrates how corpus analysis, and similar
empirically based methods of language study, can help inform
judicial assessments about language meaning. First, we briefly outline
our view of legal language and interpretation in order to
demonstrate the importance of the ordinary meaning doctrine, and
thus the relevance of tools such as corpus analysis, to legal
interpretation. Part I argues that despite the heterogeneity of the
current judicial interpretive process, and the importance of the
specific context relevant to the statute at issue, conventions of
meaning that cut across contexts are a necessary aspect of legal
interpretation. Indeed, such conventions are an important aspect of
the sequential nature of legal interpretation, whereby a court first
determines the ordinary meaning of the textual language and then
(1) accepts that meaning as the legal meaning of the text, (2) rejects
it in favor of an unordinary meaning, or (3) precisifies it in some way
because the ordinary meaning is indeterminate in relation to the
interpretive question before the court. Nevertheless, as Part II
discusses, the constituent question of what makes some permissible
meaning the ordinary meaning is an inherently normative issue that
courts typically, and incorrectly, treat as self-evident. Corpus analysis
can provide valuable insights about language usage but cannot by
itself resolve normative issues.
Parts III and IV demonstrate the potential of corpus analysis,
and similar empirically based methods of language analysis, through
the study of two rather infamous cases in which the reviewing courts
11. For a criticism of how judges use dictionaries, see Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the
Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998).
12. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2018).
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made various general claims about language meaning. In both cases,
United States v. Costello 13 and Smith v. United States, 14 the courts
made statements about language that are contradicted by
corpus analysis.
Part V demonstrates the potential of corpus analysis through
Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical. A discussion of how to
approach Hart’s hypothetical shows the potential but also the
complexities of the linguistic analyses required by such scenarios. 15
Corpus linguistics can yield results that are relevant to legal
interpretation, but performing the necessary analyses is complex and
requires significant training in order to perform them competently.
We conclude that while it is doubtful that judges will themselves
become proficient at corpus linguistics, they should be receptive to
the expert testimony of corpus linguists in appropriate circumstances.
I. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AS A SOURCE FOR ORDINARY MEANING
A. The Heterogeneity of Legal Interpretation
Legal interpretation is heterogeneous in ways that should be
accounted for when considering the value of language insights from
corpus linguistics. One of the most frequently discussed areas of
divergence involves the very question of how courts should approach
the interpretation of legal texts. While a variety of interpretive
methodologies have been suggested, the basic division is between
judges who privilege the linguistic meaning of the legal text (known
as textualists) and judges who privilege the intention or purpose of
the legislative body that enacted the text (known as intentionalists). 16
A somewhat analogous language distinction (which will be discussed
throughout this Article) between “semantics” and “pragmatics” is

13. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040.
14. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469.
15. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 36–39 (2012).
16. For a description and critique of textualism and intentionalism, see generally
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117
(2009). For purposes of this Article, intentionalism and purposivism are viewed as synonymous
and the terms are used interchangeably. Although some may argue that intentionalism and
purposivism are distinct methodologies of interpretation, any differences between the two are
not relevant to the arguments made in this Article.
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made by linguists and philosophers. With some simplification,
semantics accounts for linguistic phenomena by relating, via the rules
of the language and abstracting away from specific contexts,
linguistic expressions to the world objects to which they refer. 17 A
semantic meaning is thus one based on decoding and not intent
determining. 18 In contrast to semantics, pragmatics accounts for
linguistic phenomena by reference to the language user (producer or
interpreter), and involves inferential processes. 19 The traditional view
is that pragmatics takes as input the semantic contents of sentences
uttered in contexts. 20 After identifying the semantic content of an
utterance, pragmatic principles are used for comprehension. 21
Context is thus centrally involved in explaining how pragmatics
complements semantics. 22
Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of interpretive methodologies, it may seem uncontroversial that linguistic insights from
corpora should be deemed relevant to the questions courts ask (even
if implicitly) when interpreting legal texts. For textualists, the
relevance of linguistic insights from corpora seems obvious.
Textualism advocates that judges “should seek statutory meaning in
the semantic import of the enacted text.” 23 If the “semantic import”
of the enacted language is of crucial importance to the court, it
follows that generalizations about language usage (which corpus
linguistics can provide) would be useful to interpreters. Compared to
textualist judges, it is less intuitive that corpus linguistics should be
relevant to intentionalist or purposivist judges. After all, such judges
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See MIRA ARIEL, DEFINING PRAGMATICS 24 (2010).
See id.
See id. at 4–8, 28.
See FRANCOIS RECANATI, LITERAL MEANING 21 (2004).
An utterance is simply a “specific, concrete instance of language use.” MURPHY &
KOSKELA, supra note 9, at 167. It “can be taken to include both spoken and written language
use.” Id.
22. See id. Pragmatics is thus concerned with whatever information is relevant to
understanding an utterance, even if such information is not reflected in the syntactic properties
of the sentence. For example, one kind of pragmatic process, conversational implicature,
involves “any meaning or proposition expressed implicitly by a speaker in his or her utterance
of a sentence which is meant without being part of what is said in the strict sense.” Yan Huang,
Implicature, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 156 (Yan Huang ed., 2017). Thus,
when a speaker utters the sentence, “The soup is warm,” the speaker conversationally
implicates an augmented meaning, namely that ‘the soup is not hot.’ See id.
23. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287,
1288 (2010).
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purport to interpret statutes in light of the legislature’s intent or
purpose. Even so, a common sentiment is that intentionalists and
purposivists have “more or less adopted textualist practices as their
first plan of attack.” 24 Furthermore, courts in general often state that
the ordinary meaning of the statutory text is the “best evidence” of
legislative intent or purpose. 25 Thus, generalizations about language
usage should also be useful to intentionalist judges, even if they
may not always be viewed by intentionalists as conclusive of
statutory meaning.
Not surprisingly, given the influence of textualism since the
1980s, the idea that textual language should be given its ordinary
meaning is more frequently invoked now than in the past. 26 The
basic premise of the ordinary meaning doctrine is that a legal text is a
form of communication that uses natural language in order to
accomplish its purposes. Thus, for various reasons including rule of
law and notice concerns, textual language should be interpreted in
light of the accepted and typical standards of communication that
apply outside of the law. 27 Identifying the ordinary meaning of the
language in a legal text is therefore a purely linguistic matter. The
legal concerns of the judge are ostensibly not relevant to the
determination, although these legal concerns might influence the
ultimate meaning the court chooses. 28
Notwithstanding the presumption that textual language should
be given its ordinary meaning, heterogeneity in interpretation exists
(and would even if all judges agreed to apply the same interpretive
24. David K. Ismay & M. Anthony Brown, The Not So New Textualism: A Critique of
John Manning’s Second Generation Textualism, 31 J.L. & POL. 187, 192 (2015).
25. Sayles v. Thompson, 457 N.E.2d 440, 448 (Ill. 1983) (“The ordinary meaning of
the language employed by the drafters in the questioned constitutional or statutory clause
provides the best evidence of the drafters’ intent.”); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air
Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) (“Statutory construction must begin with the
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. See Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1610 (2012); see also infra note 82. Scalia and
Garner refer to the ordinary meaning doctrine as “the most fundamental semantic rule of
interpretation.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 69.
27. See BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 3 (2015).
28. See Brian G. Slocum, The Contribution of Linguistics to Legal Interpretation, in THE
NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL
INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 14,16 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017).
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methodology) due to the significant contribution that context makes
to meaning. Any theory of interpretation should recognize that the
linguistic meaning of a legal text is not limited to the semantic
meaning of its language but rather includes the pragmatic processes
necessary to identify the meaning of the legislative utterances. 29
While semantic meaning must in some ways account for context,
identifying the meaning of a legislative utterance requires particular
consideration of context. 30 In fact, semantic meaning and contextual
cues often have a symbiotic relationship. Scholars have demonstrated
that efficient communication systems will contain ambiguity as long
as context is informative about meaning. 31 Disambiguation occurs
because “comprehenders are able to quickly use contextual
information in the form of discourse context . . . , local linguistic
context . . . , or more global world knowledge.” 32 An efficient
communication system may thus produce ambiguous language when
it is examined out of context but “will not convey information
already provided by the context.” 33
The context in which the legislature enacted a statute is therefore
crucial to interpretation, making meaning inherently contextual and
dependent on the specific features of the particular context in any
given case. In legal cases, the contextual evidence that must be
considered is often vast and nuanced, requiring multiple inferences
about meaning. 34 Even assuming that contextual cues are indicative
of meaning, as in nonlegal communication, legal cases involve
normative judgments about possible inferences from the context that
are not relevant to nonlegal interpretation. (For example, can
29. See Scott Soames, Deferentialism, Living Originalism, and the Constitution, in THE
NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL
INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 218, 218–19 (Brian G. Slocum
ed., 2017).
30. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (“[S]tatutory interpretation turns on
‘the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole’ . . . .” (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
341 (1997))).
31. Steven T. Piantadosi, Harry Tily & Edward Gibson, The Communicative Function
of Ambiguity in Language, 122 COGNITION 280, 280 (2012).
32. Id. at 289.
33. Id. at 282.
34. Consider, for example, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner’s recent book, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Texts, which lists dozens of principles and canons of interpretation,
all of which relate in some way to the context of the statute. SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 15.
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evidence from legislative history be considered and is it sometimes
persuasive?) Furthermore, even if a judge adheres to a particular
methodology of interpretation, it may not be predictable how that
judge will weigh the often conflicting sources of meaning. The judge
might find evidence from legislative history (or a textual canon,
dictionary definition, or any number of other determinants of
meaning) persuasive in one case but not another, while another
judge using the same sources and considering the same evidence
might reach a different conclusion. 35 Legal interpretation can thus be
seen as a very personal, a perhaps idiosyncratic, endeavor.
The relevant contextual considerations in legal interpretation are
thus intensely legal in nature, involving various background
interpretive principles as well as the remainder of the corpus juris. 36
Legal interpretation is an inherently legal process and not one
designed to determine meaning as one would outside of the law (as
in a private correspondence, for example). 37 Courts do not seek the
general meaning of a word (or even a sentence); instead, they seek
something broader and more along the lines of what a reasonable
person would take the author to be conveying by the chosen
language in the given communicative context. 38 Because the process

35. No methodology of interpretation, such as textualism or intentionalism, has been
sufficiently developed so that it contains precise instructions regarding under what
circumstances a particular interpretive principle should be applied and how it should be
applied. Even if such instructions existed, they would necessarily be sufficiently general so that
heterogeneity of results would still obtain.
36. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991) (“Where a
statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that
permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both
previously and subsequently enacted law. . . . We do so . . . because it is our role to make sense
rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079, as recognized in Landgraf v.
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
37. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist
Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within
Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 707 (2014) (“Modern textualists emphasize that Congress
invariably legislates against the background of a number of linguistic and cultural
understandings that influence, and indeed determine, what a linguistically competent person
would understand a statute to say.”).
38. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.
417, 417–18 (1899) (indicating that the interpreter’s role is not to ask what the author meant
to convey but instead determine “what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal
speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used.”); see also Fallon,
supra note 37, at 703 (arguing that “[o]nce an interpretive context is specified, both
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must take account of various considerations unique to the law,
nonlegal generalizations about language usage are seen by some to
be relatively unimportant if not irrelevant. 39 In this light, the focus of
concern in legal interpretation should be on how best to account for
the ways in which context shapes meaning rather than how to find
generalizations about language that cut across contexts.
B. Ordinary Meaning as a Necessary Component of Legal Meaning
Judicial practice and the very nature of legal interpretation
complicate the above described context-centric view of interpretation. For instance, the rule of law requires that governing rules
provide advance notice to enable people to plan their affairs with
knowledge of the legal consequences of their actions. 40 Thus, despite
the context-sensitive nature of natural language communication, a
basic assumption of at least some legal texts (e.g., criminal statutes)
is that they should be understood by different people, including the
general public, in the same way and the understanding should be
based on the semantic meaning of the language. 41 Such an
assumption suggests that these texts should be interpreted according
to standards of communication that give texts readily discernible
meanings based on a somewhat limited consideration of context. 42
Even if one discounts the influence of the rule of law on legal
interpretation, it seems implausible that courts would systematically
disregard the semantic meanings of words. Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive of a realistic interpretive methodology in which the
semantic meanings of the words did not generally act (at the least) as
a constraint on permissible interpretations. 43

[textualists and purposivists] rely on a largely unanalyzed notion of reasonableness to
determine ultimate meaning.”).
39. See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, On Whose Authority?: Linguists’ Claim of Expertise to
Interpret Statutes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025, 1034 (1995) (arguing that “[w]hen judges say
plain meaning, they may not mean plain meaning in a sense that linguists would recognize as
ordinary language.” (emphasis omitted)).
40. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ‘‘The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1997).
41. See Cappelen, supra note 2.
42. Notice is especially important in some areas, such as with criminal statutes. See
Fallon, supra note 40, at 48.
43. See SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 91. Of course, it is possible to point to
interpretations where the linguistic meaning of the text did not act as a constraint on the
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To illustrate, consider H. L. A. Hart’s famous hypothetical
involving a rule that “forbids you to take a vehicle into the public
park.” 44 Suppose a case arises in which a citation is given to a person
walking his dog through the park. There have been several dog
attacks in the park (some might even say that it has been an
epidemic), and the dog at issue is a member of the breed that has
been responsible for the majority of the attacks. The court,
considering purpose at a high level of generality, decides that the
protection of park users (the identified purpose of the provision)
dictates that certain dangerous breeds of dogs fall within the scope of
the provision. The court thus determines that the dog in question is
a “vehicle” within the meaning of the statute.
The court’s decision in the above case, even if well-intentioned,
would likely be harshly criticized by many commentators. Under
common usage, a dog is clearly not a vehicle, and there is no
plausible argument that dogs are even borderline cases of vehicles, as
any empirical investigation would no doubt confirm. 45 Critics would
likely argue that the court’s decision fails to adhere to important rule
of law principles. These criticisms would be made even if the case did
not involve a situation in which notice would be particularly
important. To disregard the text of the law, by ignoring the principle
that words have ordinary and ascertainable meanings, would be to
fail to comply with rule of law principles. 46 This line of criticism
would likely hold even if the court could find some evidence that the
legislative intent was that “vehicle” in the provision should have a
very broad meaning. 47 Indeed, the criticisms reflect an underlying
belief, captured by the ordinary meaning doctrine, that the meaning
lexicalized by a word (i.e., its semantic meaning) is generalizable
across contexts, not based on any specific interpretive clues that can
interpretation chosen by the court. The exceptions do not, however, undermine the generality
that linguistic meaning acts (at least) as a constraint on possible legal meaning.
44. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1958).
45. Of course, the issue might be closer if the dog was transporting someone (perhaps a
small child) on its back. Nevertheless, it is not a controversial claim that there exist objects that
clearly are not vehicles.
46. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at xxix, 4 (arguing that courts should act as
faithful agents of the legislature, which includes an acceptance that “words convey
discernible meanings”).
47. Obviously, the legislature can stipulate an unordinary meaning in the text of the
statute, which a court would be bound to implement.
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be traced to the drafter of the text. Under a mainstream view of
lexical semantics, and consistent with Hart’s analysis, knowledge of
the semantic meaning of a word like vehicle may not resolve all
interpretive disputes, because the inherent fuzziness of words means
that there will be uncertainties regarding the word’s scope of domain
(i.e., the objects to which the word should be applied). 48
Nevertheless, the semantic meaning can fairly rule out some objects
(like dogs) as being vehicles.
The picture of legal interpretation that should emerge is one in
which the interpreter determines meaning on the basis of various
interpretive tools, most of which are based on conventions of
meaning or other principles resting on generalized assumptions
about language usage. 49 Still, while the interpreter must determine
the meaning of the text on the basis of the words used and their
composition, the consideration of context is crucial to meaning,
both within and outside of law. 50 In general,
[a] typical author in typical circumstances is motivated to exploit
external factors in order to provide the interpreter with sufficiently
clear evidence that will enable the interpreter to interpret the
inscription as intended. In fact, the author cannot reasonably
expect the interpreter to recognize the intended meaning unless
the author believes that sufficient cues exist and are available to the
interpreter to determine the meaning. 51

Nevertheless, the context available in interpreting legal texts may
often be multivocal and involves normative judgments about
whether a possible determinant (e.g., legislative history) may
be considered.
The interpretive process thus involves a mix of determinants of
meaning, all of which relate in some way to the relevant statute,
whether the relation is to the statute’s language or the circumstances
48. See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text (discussing fuzziness in
word meanings).
49. See generally SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 2–3 (describing the determinants of the
ordinary meaning doctrine, which are all dependent on generalized assumptions about
language usage).
50. MURPHY & KOSKELA, supra note 9, at 36 (“The principle of compositionality states
that the meaning of a complex linguistic expression is built up from the meanings of its
composite parts in a rule-governed fashion.” Thus, a sentence is compositional if its meaning is
the sum of the meanings of its parts and of the relations of the parts.).
51. SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 93.
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surrounding the statute’s enactment. Legislative history, for example,
allows the interpreter to consider the particular context surrounding
the enactment of a statute and make inferences about legislative
intent based on that evidence. 52 Other determinants depend
primarily on the systematicities of language rather than multiple
interpretive clues drawn from the particular context of a statute. 53
The ordinary meaning doctrine acts as an umbrella concept that
encompasses various such determinants. 54 Dictionaries are an
obvious, and commonly used, example. A dictionary definition is
considered useful, not because it reveals some particular legislative
intent, but rather because of both the (often mistaken) belief that
the definition provides the ordinary meaning of the relevant word
and the correlative generalized presumption that the legislature
intended for the word to be given its ordinary meaning. However,
dictionaries, in general, list words as a set of isolated items, and
dictionary definitions cannot account for the particular context of
the provision at issue. 55
Notwithstanding the existence of determinants of meaning that
relate to the particularized context of a statute, such as legislative
history, it is not surprising that courts consistently state that the
words of the text, and the ordinary meaning of those words, are the
surest, safest evidence of a legislature’s intentions. 56 As previously
indicated, people are generally motivated to choose words that
express their intended meaning. 57 Due to the multivocal nature of
contextual evidence relating to actual authorial intent, discerning
that intent apart from the ordinary meaning of the words used is an
uncertain proposition. 58 Despite the importance of context,

52. For an analysis of legislative history, see, for example, James J. Brudney & Corey
Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the
Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220 (2006); Charles Tiefer, The
Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205.
53. See SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 213–76 (discussing ordinary meaning and lexical
semantics in legal interpretation).
54. See generally SLOCUM, supra note 27 (analyzing the various interpretive principles
that can be said to determine ordinary meaning).
55. See M. A. K. HALLIDAY & COLIN YALLOP, LEXICOLOGY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION
24–25 (2007).
56. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
57. SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 98.
58. See John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1947
(2015) (analyzing the difficulties of ascertaining legislative intent).
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determinants of meaning that relate only superficially (or partially) to
the particularized context of the provision and depend on
generalized assumptions about legislative intent, such as dictionaries,
can be valuable tools of legal interpretation. 59 They must, however,
be combined with an examination of the particularized context of
the statute in order to fix the meaning of the relevant provision.
C. Ordinary Meaning and Sequential Interpretation
The heterogeneity of the determinantes of legal meaning makes
the justificatory requirements of legal interpretation critical. By
distinguishing between semantics and pragmatics, language theorists
can more perspicuously address both the conventions and
systematicities of language (i.e., semantics) and the inferential
processes involved in determining a speaker or author’s meaning
(i.e., pragmatics). 60 In a similar way, the sequential process of
statutory interpretation allows courts to express the different aspects
of determining the legal meaning of a text. By providing an initial
anchoring point for deciding whether arguments about meaning are
accepted or rejected, the ordinary meaning concept is an essential
aspect of legal interpretation that enhances judicial accountability. A
sequential process whereby ordinary meaning is first explicitly
determined and then (1) accepted as the legal meaning of the text,
(2) rejected in favor of an unordinary meaning, or (3) precisified in
some way because the ordinary meaning is indeterminate in relation
to the interpretive question before the court, is preferable to an
alternative where the legal meaning is decided without considering
the ordinary meaning of the text.
Notwithstanding its importance, the presumptive meaning
created by the ordinary meaning doctrine can be overcome on
whatever basis a court finds persuasive. Frequently, a court will
choose an interpretation that is motivated by concerns specific to the
law, such as the desire to avoid serious constitutional questions. 61 In
other situations, a particular context will indicate that some
59. See infra note 82 (criticizing judicial reliance on dictionaries).
60. Certainly, there are also numerous systematicities associated with pragmatics. See
generally FRANÇOIS RECANATI, TRUTH-CONDITIONAL PRAGMATICS (2010). It is nonetheless
useful to distinguish between semantics and pragmatics when analyzing language.
61. See generally Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000).
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unordinary meaning was intended. For example, if an intentionalist
judge believes that the ordinary meaning of the relevant language
conflicts with legislative intent, the judge may choose a different
meaning. In these cases, as well as many cases involving interpretations motivated by legal concerns, the legal meaning given to the
text will differ from the ordinary meaning of the words used. 62
Judicial decisions regarding ordinary meaning are typically
explained in the judge’s opinion, thereby illustrating the justificatory
nature of legal interpretation. In general courts do not simply
announce or assume that a particular interpretation is correct but
rather explain their process of reasoning. Specifically, courts explain
how the evidence establishes a meaning that corresponds with one of
the objectives of interpretation, such as determining the ordinary
meaning of the language. 63 An ordinary meaning determination,
therefore, adds explicit structure to what might otherwise be a
comparatively open-ended judicial explanation if only the final legal
meaning of the text were being determined. Thus, notwithstanding
its defeasibility, the presumption of ordinary meaning sets a useful
default which requires that deviations be explained and justified or
that the indefinite nature of the language be identified. Of course,
courts might erroneously evaluate the relevant language, such as by
exaggerating its definiteness. Judges are, nevertheless, accountable
for the meanings they choose in the sense that they should give
reasons for their decisions. 64
Ordinary meaning is, thus, a presumptive meaning that can be
modified on the basis of concerns specific to the law or a conclusion
62. See also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 706 n.9 (2000) (explaining that
the Court was “departing from the rule of construction that prefers ordinary meaning . . . .
[T]his is exactly what ought to happen when the ordinary meaning fails to fit the text and
when the realization of clear congressional policy . . . is in tension with the result that
customary interpretive rules would deliver.”), superseded by statute, 21st Century Department
of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1806
(2002); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 70 (stating that “[o]ne should assume the
contextually appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think otherwise.
Sometimes there is reason to think otherwise, which ordinarily comes from context.”)
(emphasis removed). A particular context may also make a vague or general meaning more
precise by indicating that some more determinate meaning was intended by the legislature
than the textual language that was used.
63. The relevant standard is typically seen by courts as a straightforward search for the
“correct” interpretation.
64. See generally Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1571 (1988).
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(based on contextual cues) that the legislature intended to give the
language a meaning other than its ordinary meaning. Nevertheless,
the above discussion that distinguishes between ordinary meaning
and the legal meaning given to the text by the judge is, admittedly,
somewhat normative, rather than descriptive, in nature. Courts do
not uniformly or consistently discuss or distinguish these concepts. 65
Though, if it is to be a coherent concept, the notion of ordinary
meaning must entail that some meanings can be grammatical and
comprehensible but nevertheless unusual and thus not ordinary. 66 In
that sense, the ordinary meaning doctrine establishes a constraint on
interpretations that presumptively excludes meanings that are
unlikely or unusual.
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACH TO ORDINARY MEANING
If the linguistic meaning of a legal text is an integral aspect of its
legal meaning, even if not always decisive, an accurate understanding
of the conventions and systematicities of language should be
important to legal interpreters. Unlike the ultimate legal meaning
given a text, which may well reflect considerations other than
language, an ordinary meaning should be orthogonal to such
concerns. 67 Determining ordinary meaning though may seem at
different times, either self-evident or elusive. Courts must answer,
even if implicitly, both the constituent question of what makes a
meaning the ordinary one and the evidential question of what are
the proper determinants of ordinary meaning. 68 The constituent

65. A recent exception is Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012),
where the Court determined that “interpreter” can, but does not ordinarily, include one who
translates written documents, reasoning that just because a dictionary “definition is broad
enough to encompass one sense of a word does not establish that the word is ordinarily
understood in that sense.” Id. at 568 (emphasis omitted). The Court indicated that an
unordinary, but sometimes used, meaning of the word, which includes document translation,
would not control “unless the context in which the word appears indicates that it does.” Id.
at 569.
66. See infra notes 129–57 and accompanying text (describing Smith v. United States,
508 U.S. 223 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112
Stat. 3469, where Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that the Court’s meaning was grammatical
and comprehensible, but nonetheless unordinary).
67. See supra notes 3, 41 and accompanying text (explaining that the ordinary meaning
doctrine is based on the presumption that legal and nonlegal language coincide).
68. See SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 94–95 (describing the constituent and
evidential questions).
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question requires that one believe that there is such a thing as an
“ordinary meaning” and that ordinary meaning can be distinguished
from other concepts, such as technical or unusual meaning. In turn,
the evidential question might be framed as empirical in nature and
based on an accurate understanding of language. Perhaps because
the answers to the constituent and evidential questions may seem
elusive or daunting, they are typically treated by courts as selfevident. 69 This Part does not seek to comprehensively answer the
constituent and evidential questions but rather outlines the issues
involved in answering these questions before briefly addressing how
corpus linguistics is relevant to the resolution of the issues raised.
A. The Constituent Question of Ordinary Meaning
The constituent question may seem self-evident to courts and
others because language usage is effortless for the average native
speaker of a language. A typical person encounters thousands of
words in a single day and uses them with great facility, seemingly
without thinking. 70 In a real sense, even nonlinguists are experts in
their native languages. For instance, judgments by native speakers of
the grammaticality and acceptability of sentences, as well as other
linguistic intuitions, can be a major source of evidence for linguists
when constructing grammars. 71 In contrast, the selection of some
standard of meaning commonness, or some other linguistic measure
necessary to constitute ordinary meaning, is a normative matter that
must be decided based on the needs of the legal profession. 72
However, courts have not offered consistent answers to the
constituent question of what makes a meaning the ordinary one. At
times, the Supreme Court has indicated that a permissible but
unusual usage may not fall within the ordinary meaning of a word. 73
In contrast, in the (in)famous case, Smith v. United States, the Court

69.
70.

See id. at 2–3.
JEAN AITCHISON, WORDS IN THE MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MENTAL
LEXICON 3 (4th ed. 2012).
71. CARSON T. SCHÜTZE, THE EMPIRICAL BASE OF LINGUISTICS: GRAMMATICALITY
JUDGMENTS AND LINGUISTIC METHODOLOGY xvii (2016).
72. Of course, linguistics can help determine whether that standard has been met.
73. See supra note 65 (describing Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S.
560 (2012)).
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suggested that an unusual but still permissible usage would fall
within the ordinary meaning of the relevant language. 74
Other facts specific to the law also distinguish legal language
from nonlegal discourse and, in some ways, make legal interpretation
more difficult and less susceptible to layperson judgment. For
instance, routine, everyday interpretation often yields a “merely
‘good enough’” meaning, “rather than a detailed linguistic
representation of an utterance’s meaning.” 75 However, litigated cases
frequently pose close and contested issues of meaning that implicate
linguistic knowledge that is rarely deemed pertinent to routine,
nonlegal verbal interactions. Such advanced knowledge of syntax and
semantics is not obtained merely by fluent knowledge of a language.
A judge might, for example, be called to consider the relevance of a
comma (or its absence) to the meaning of the text. 76 This sort of
interpretive problem does not occur in oral conversations and may
be infrequently encountered by the ordinary person. Furthermore,
legal cases often involve lexical fuzziness or underspecification that
may not be a concern in ordinary conversations but may pose
problems in legal interpretation. Legal interpretation is binary in
nature and requires a “yes” or “no” answer to resolve the legal
dispute at issue. If, for example, the dispute involves a matter of
categorization (e.g., is a Segway a vehicle?), the court must give a
definitive answer even if language experts indicate that category
membership among ordinary language users is properly viewed as a
matter of degree. 77
The strong norm encouraging the externality of judicial decisionmaking, reflected in the ordinary meaning doctrine, also adds
production costs to the identification of ordinary meaning. If the
identification of ordinary meaning is not satisfied merely by the
74. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 230 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of
Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469; see infra Part IV (describing and
analyzing the case).
75. See Fernanda Ferreira, The Misinterpretation of Noncanonical Sentences, 47
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 164 (2003).
76. Courts will, for example, consider a principle such as the rule of the last antecedent,
which provides that when a modifier is set off from a series of antecedents by a comma, the
modifier should be interpreted to apply to all the antecedents. Terri LeClercq, Doctrine of the
Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous Modifiers, 2 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 81, 87 (1996).
77. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing the no-vehicles-in-thepark hypothetical).
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judge’s personal intuitions as a fluent speaker of the language but
rather depends to some degree on external verification, the
requirement that articulated reasons support the meaning chosen
will tend to make the process elusive rather than self-evident. The
philosopher Waismann, writing about the “ordinary use of language”
by philosophers, wondered, “[H]ow ought one to determine what
this ordinary use is, e.g. in a case of doubt?” 78 One could “ask
people,” perhaps targeting the “competent ones,” which may be
difficult or controversial. 79 With legal interpretation, a court might
ask what a “reasonable person” would deem to be the ordinary
meaning of the provision, but the reasonable person standard
provides dubious externality when it is used by a judge with no
external determinants of meaning. 80
The reasonable person standard may have some value in
underscoring that an interpretation should be external to the,
perhaps idiosyncratic, personal views of the judge, instead being
based on the conventions of the larger community. But the
reasonable person standard does not itself provide any sort of
empirical test for the conventions of the relevant language
community. 81 Considering that the “reasonable person” is a fictional
construct, it is intuitive that judges might seek to test the ordinary
meaning of textual language through some scenario that is real
rather than an abstract construct. For instance, Justice Scalia
wondered in a dissenting opinion whether “the acid test of whether a
word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you could
use the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people
look at you funny. The Court’s assigned meaning would surely fail
that test, even late in the evening.” 82 Similarly, in a concurring
78. F. Waismann, Analytic-Synthetic IV, 11 ANALYSIS 115, 122 (1951).
79. Id.
80. It would be circular to aver that a meaning is ordinary simply by virtue of the actual
interpreter proclaiming it as such. There is therefore a necessary distinction between what is in
fact the case and what any given individual believes to be the case.
81. See Karen Petroski, The Strange Fate of Holmes’s Normal Speaker of English, in THE
NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL
INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY, 105–29 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017)
(discussing the failure of courts to develop the reasonable person standard with respect
to interpretation).
82. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
superseded by statute, 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1806 (2002). Not surprisingly, the Court in its majority

1436

4.GRIESSLOCUM_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1417

4/26/2018 4:01 PM

Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics

opinion that argued for a restricted meaning for “tangible object” in
the statutory phrase “any record, document, or tangible object,”
Justice Alito wondered, “who wouldn’t raise an eyebrow if a
neighbor, when asked to identify something similar to a ‘record’ or
‘document,’ said ‘crocodile’?” 83 Of course, neither a “cocktail party”
standard nor an “eyebrow” standard can be adopted as a general test
of ordinary meaning; rather, they serve to highlight the absence of
competing standards used by judges.
B. The Evidential Question of Ordinary Meaning
The constituent question of what makes some meaning the
ordinary one is intimately intertwined with the evidential question of
the proper determinants of ordinary meaning and, in light of the
absence of any clear answer for the constituent question, answering
the latter question seems to answer the former. Consider one
prominent determinant of meaning—dictionary definitions—which
currently are used as a sort of substitute for corpus analysis. Courts
frequently rely on dictionary definitions to determine meaning. 84
The increased judicial reliance on dictionaries since the 1980s can be
traced to the influence of textualism and its focus on linguistic
meaning. 85 Judges undoubtedly believe that dictionaries provide an
expert, neutral, and external standard for the ordinary meaning of
words. A dictionary definition is not created for the purpose of
litigation, is external to the judge, and is not widely viewed as being
created on the basis of ideological biases. Furthermore, the difficult
work of defining a word in a dictionary has already been performed
by an expert. The judge merely has to consult a dictionary and select
the appropriate meaning for the word. Although judicial reliance on
dictionaries has increased, their usefulness in determining ordinary
meaning has been challenged.
opinion indicated that it did not “consider usage at a cocktail party a very sound general
criterion of statutory meaning.” Id. at 706 n.9 (majority opinion).
83. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1089 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment).
84. See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s
Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483,
483 (2013).
85. See id. (explaining that, while the United States Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries
was virtually nonexistent before 1987, now as many as one-third of statutory decisions cite
dictionary definitions).
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Some of the issues regarding dictionaries concern how they are
(mis)used by judges. Critics have, for example, addressed judges’
tendency to go “dictionary shopping,” which allows them to select
the particular dictionary and definition that furthers the judge’s
personal predilections. 86 A further problem is that courts often
erroneously treat the definitions as though they set forth necessary
and sufficient conditions of category membership. 87 If ordinary
meaning is being sought, a strict, quasi-mathematical symbolization
of meaning is deeply flawed. As argued above, judges are typically
motivated to define words in such a way as to avoid uncertainty in
application, which assists the judge in reaching the required “yes or
no” answer in what seems like an objective manner. The court can
therefore point to a broad dictionary definition (e.g., something
defining vehicles as “means of carrying or transporting something ·
planes, trains, and other vehicles” 88) and treat the definition as
though it sets forth necessary and sufficient conditions for the
concept. Defining words in such a manner may seem to narrow
interpretive discretion. The result, however, is contrary to the
empirical findings and theoretical work of linguists and psychologists
regarding the nature of word meanings. 89
Other issues involving the construction of dictionaries should
also undercut their use by judges. For example, dictionaries tend to
favor definitions that represent technical meanings, which may not
accurately reflect the ordinary meaning of the words. 90 A different
issue concerns the contribution that context makes to meaning.
While dictionaries are useful as a general matter, “the listing of words
as a set of isolated items can be highly misleading if used as a basis of

86.
87.

See Aprill, supra note 11.
See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION 62–63 (2010).
88. Vehicle, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/veh
icle (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
89. See SOLAN, supra note 87, at 63–66.
90. Thus, dictionaries do not always reflect the important distinction between the
flexible meaning of terms in natural language and the stipulative definitions of the scientist.
Patrick Hanks explains that “[g]iving a precise, unambiguous definition for a word is a
stipulative procedure, not a descriptive one, and a stipulative definition inevitably assigns the
status of technical term to the word so defined, removing it from the creative potential that is
offered by fuzzy meaning in natural language.” PATRICK HANKS, LEXICAL ANALYSIS: NORMS
AND EXPLOITATIONS 8 (2013).
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theorizing about what words and their meanings are.” 91 The
problem is that a dictionary is a highly abstract work that presents
words individually and takes them “away from their common use in
their customary settings.” 92
Philosophers of language and linguists typically focus on
sentences as the relevant units of meaning. 93 In contrast, the
judiciary’s “focus on word meaning instead of sentence meaning
stems from [its] overreliance on dictionaries, which offer acontextual
word meanings.” 94 Instead of an exclusive focus on word meaning, a
distinction should be made between the meaning of words and the
meaning of sentences. 95 Defining ordinary meaning in terms of
sentence meaning helps to mitigate the tension between the inherent
nature of contextual consideration by an interpreter and the necessity
of definitional generalizability. Thus, ultimately the relevant ordinary
meaning inquiry should not focus on words or expressions such as
use or vehicle, which encompass numerous and varied senses. Instead,
the focus should be on the ordinary meaning of the sentences in
which the words appear. 96
Determinants of ordinary meaning such as dictionaries respond
to the externality issue in legal interpretation where, without
evidence external to the interpreter, the basic guide to meaning is
the interpreter’s own world knowledge. Consequently, identifying
and assessing the reliability of possible determinants is an essential
aspect of the ordinary meaning determination. As the previous
91. HALLIDAY & YALLOP, supra note 55, at 25.
92. Id.
93. Word Meaning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries
/word-meaning/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
94. SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 107.
95. See BERNARD S. JACKSON, MAKING SENSE IN LAW: LINGUISTIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVES 43 (1995).
96. One alternative to a focus on sentence meaning is to assert that “the basic unit of
meaning [is] not the sentence, but the relations among sentences.” SLOCUM, supra note 27, at
107. Obviously, the relations among sentences might reveal that the communicative meaning
of a text differs from its ordinary meaning. Such an observation does not establish, though,
that the basic unit of meaning is not the sentence. As explained above, there are advantages to
a sequential kind of interpretation that starts with something more basic than an entire
document, or even multiple sentences. Still, while the ordinary meaning focus should be on
the relevant sentence rather than individual words or the entire document (or statute), this
focus should not be taken as a precise standard. The point is that acontexual searches for
individual word meanings lead to inaccurate ordinary meaning determinations, but a focus on
an entire document (or statute) or body of law would result in a search for communicative
meaning and not ordinary meaning.
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discussion of dictionaries illustrates, the current determinants do not
uncontroversially identify ordinary meaning. To the extent that
ordinary meaning is an empirical question, courts and others should
consider the possibility that other determinants might be better
suited to the task.
C. Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic Knowledge
Regardless of the status of dictionaries in legal interpretation,
only very basic linguistic analysis is necessary to convince most
people that a dog is not a vehicle. However, the situation is different
when the question involves objects harder to classify (e.g., golf cart,
Segway, scooter). 97 In such cases, the extension (i.e., its referential
range of application) of vehicle must be determined. But linguistic
theory indicates that in a borderline case there is no linguistic factof-the-matter to discover. 98 Understanding this aspect of word
meanings may lead a judge to conclude that the semantic meaning of
the concept ‘vehicle’ does not determine the proper categorization
of the object being considered (such as a Segway). Instead, the case
must be decided on other grounds, such as the purpose of
the provision.
As the above scenario illustrates, if legal texts are to be
interpreted in light of the accepted and typical standards of
communication that apply outside of the law, an accurate knowledge
of language—which would include an understanding of lexical
fuzziness—should be indispensable to interpretation. Such
knowledge may not be decisive to meaning, as legal considerations
may be influential, but it can nevertheless serve an integral role in a
court’s analysis. Counterintuitively perhaps, the application of
accurate linguistic analysis to the interpretive question can
underscore the importance and necessity of nonlinguistic knowledge.
Correct linguistic analysis of issues such as lexical fuzziness can reveal
the indefinite nature of language, which makes resorting to other
considerations necessary. Such a result can, therefore, help frame the
scope of judicial discretion accurately and explicitly, adding to the
justificatory nature of legal interpretation.
97. These examples are taken from Justice Scalia’s analysis of the no-vehicles-in-thepark hypothetical. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 36.
98. See STEWART SHAPIRO, VAGUENESS IN CONTEXT 2 (2006).
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However, some have advocated that the use of corpus linguistics
may solve certain long-standing problems of legal interpretation,
including those involving lexical fuzziness. 99 Like dictionaries, corpus
linguistics can provide externality to interpretations, but, in contrast
to dictionaries, corpus linguistics is a method for studying language
in use and can thus account for some aspects of context. 100 Unlike
dictionaries, corpus linguistics allows for the meanings of words to
be investigated in light of other words in which they co-occur.
Instead of relying on the, perhaps idiosyncratic, views of the
interpreter, corpus linguistics can provide an empirically based
method of examining word meaning. Indeed, many linguists have
turned to corpus data because they believe there is more to data
collection than researchers intuiting acceptability judgments about
what one can say and what one cannot. 101 This is especially true given
the volatility that individual judgments about acceptability have been
shown to exhibit. 102
The concept underlying corpus linguistics is also consistent with
the idea that an ordinary meaning is one that, in some sense, is
general and cuts across contexts. Corpus-linguistic analyses are
“always based on the evaluation of some kind of frequencies,” and
frequency is a crucial aspect of what distinguishes an ordinary
meaning from some meaning that is perhaps grammatical but
unordinary. 103 Corpus linguistics can identify not only the number of
senses (i.e., meanings) a linguistic expression may have but also
which meaning is most frequently used. 104 It can provide clues as to
what the most prototypical meaning of an expression might be based
on various factors such as (i) highest frequency of use in corpus data,
(ii) most even distribution/dispersion in a corpus (which
corresponds to a meaning being used in many very different
registers/genres), (iii) being the meaning that is acquired earliest by
99. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 12, at 3–5.
100. See HANS LINDQUIST, CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF ENGLISH
1 (2009) (“The argument is that if you are interested in the workings of a particular language,
like English, it is a good idea to study English in use. One efficient way of doing this is to use
corpus methodology . . . .”).
101. Stefan Th. Gries, What is Corpus Linguistics?, 3 LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS
COMPASS 1225, 1228 (2009).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1226.
104. See id.
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children as they learn their mother tongue, (iv) centrality of a
meaning in terms of how it is related to all other meanings a word
may have, (v) a meaning of an expression can be seen as prototypical
if it is the meaning with the highest number of features with the
highest cue validities (which is a statistical way of measuring how
predictive a feature is for membership in a category: having feathers
and a beak increases the chances of something being a bird, having
eyes does not). 105 Of course, corpus linguistics requires a (testable)
conceptual leap from frequencies to the issue being researched by
the user. Thus, any corpus findings must be analyzed within some
framework or understanding of ordinary meaning.
Because ordinary meaning must in some sense be generalizable
across contexts, not shaped by legal concerns, it is subject in some
way to empirical verification. Certainly, as indicated above, corpus
linguistics can take account of context in ways that dictionaries
cannot. Nevertheless, unlike other determinants of meaning such as
legislative history, the main function of corpus analysis is to provide
data about word meanings that cut across contexts. While such
information can of course be useful, this limitation helps to explain
why meaning is often fixed in other ways, such as the structure or
context of the statute at issue.
III. UNITED STATES V. COSTELLO
A. Description of the Case
The first of our case studies involves the statute at issue in United
States v. Costello. 106 In Costello, the defendant was charged with
violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which provides for criminal
penalties for anyone who
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come
to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law,
conceals, harbors or shields from detection [or attempts to do any
of these things], such alien in any place, including any building or
any means of transportation[.]

105. The assumption “underlying most corpus-based analyses” is the so-called
distributional hypothesis, “that formal differences reflect, or correspond to, functional
differences” (i.e., semantic). Id. at 1228.
106. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012).
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The defendant “lived in a small Illinois town” and “had a
romantic relationship” with a person “she knew to be an illegal
alien.” 107 The man lived with her for about a year but was eventually
removed to Mexico after having spent several years in prison. 108 The
man returned to the United States without authorization and “the
defendant picked him up at the Greyhound bus terminal in St. Louis
and drove him to her home,” located “about five miles from St.
Louis.” 109 The man lived in the defendant’s home, “more or less
continuously,” for approximately seven months “until his arrest.” 110
After a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of the three charged
offenses of “concealing, harboring, and shielding from detection an
alien known to be in this country illegally.” 111
Because “there [was] no evidence that the defendant concealed
her boyfriend or shielded him from detection,” on appeal the
Seventh Circuit focused on whether the harboring conviction was
justified. 112 Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
stated that the government, relying on dictionary definitions, argued
that to harbor “just means to house a person” and “to shelter.” 113
Posner reasoned that to shelter has an “aura of protectiveness,”
requiring that the defendant “provide a refuge” and not merely let
her boyfriend live with her. 114 Judge Posner further argued that, in
any case, dictionary definitions should be “used as sources of
statutory meaning only with great caution”; 115 not only must
statutory purpose be considered, 116 but also “[t]here are a wide
variety of dictionaries,” typically with multiple definitions for each
word, which makes resorting to dictionaries to determine ordinary
meaning “particularly troubling.” 117 Furthermore, “[d]ictionary
definitions are acontextual, whereas the meaning of sentences
depends critically on context, including all sorts of background

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1041–42.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1043.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1044.
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understandings.” 118 In addition, legislatures often draft provisions
with lists of words in order to foreclose loopholes but not necessarily
to create a provision that extends beyond its purpose. 119
Instead of relying solely on the dictionary definitions, Judge
Posner conducted a Google search on December 13, 2011, “of
several terms in which the word ‘harboring’ appears.” 120 The search
was based on the “supposition that the number of hits per term is a
rough index of the frequency of its use.” 121 The search revealed
the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

“harboring fugitives”: 50,800 hits
“harboring enemies”: 4,730 hits
“harboring refugees”: 4,820 hits
“harboring victims”: 114 hits
“harboring flood victims”: 0 hits
“harboring victims of disasters”: 0 hits
“harboring victims of persecution”: 0 hits
“harboring guests”: 184 hits
“harboring friends”: 256 hits (but some involve harboring
Quakers—”Friends,” viewed in colonial New England as
dangerous heretics)
“harboring Quakers”: 3,870 hits
“harboring Jews”: 19,100 hits. 122

For Judge Posner, it was “apparent” from the results of the
Google search that harboring, unlike sheltering, has a connotation of
“deliberately safeguarding members of a specified group from the
authorities, whether through concealment, movement to a safe
location, or physical protection.” 123 Considering the requirement of
“deliberate[] safeguarding,” Judge Posner reasoned that
the emergency staff at the hospital may not be “harboring” an alien
when [they] render[] emergency treatment even if [the alien] stays
in the emergency room overnight, that giving a lift to a gas station
to an alien with a flat tire may not be harboring, that driving an
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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alien to the local office of the Department of Homeland Security to
apply for an adjustment of status to that of lawful resident may not
be harboring, that inviting an alien for a “one night stand” may not
be attempted harboring, that placing an illegal alien in a school
may not be harboring . . . and finally that allowing your boyfriend
to live with you may not be harboring, even if you know he
shouldn’t be in the United States. 124

Judge Posner classified conceals, harbors, and shields as “loopholestopping near synonyms,” 125 but indicated that harboring was still
not redundant. According to Judge Posner,
“concealing” is concealing; “shielding from detection” usually is
concealing but could involve bribing law enforcement authorities—
in other words paying someone else to conceal (yet the shade of
difference is tiny—no surprise in a string of near synonyms); and
the office left to “harboring” is, then, materially to assist an alien to
remain illegally in the United States without publicly advertising
his presence but without needing or bothering to conceal it . . .
though harboring could involve advertising, for instance if a church
publicly offered sanctuary for illegal aliens and committed to resist
any effort by the authorities to enter the church’s premises to
arrest them. 126

Following from the above definitions, Judge Posner presented
the following scenario, which involves the concept of ‘harboring’ but
not of ‘concealing’ or ‘shielding’:
Suppose the owner of a Chinese restaurant in New York’s or San
Francisco’s Chinatown employs known illegal aliens as cooks,
waiters, and busboys because they are cheap labor, and provides
them with housing in order to make the employment, poorly paid
though it is, more attractive, and also because they lack
documentation that other landlords would require of would-be
renters. The owner is harboring these illegal aliens in the sense of
taking strong measures to keep them here. Yet there may be no
effort at concealment or shielding from detection, simply because
the immigration authorities, having very limited investigative
resources, may have no interest in rooting out illegal aliens in
Chinese restaurants in Chinatowns. It is nonetheless harboring in

124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1044–45.
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1046–47.
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an appropriate sense because the illegal status of the alien is
inseparable from the decision to provide housing—it is a decision
to provide a refuge for an illegal alien because he’s an illegal alien. 127

Unlike the defendant’s actions, the restaurant owner “provides
an inducement to illegal aliens.” 128 Furthermore, the example
illustrates that harboring is not redundant with concealing
because the
owner does not house his illegal employees in order to conceal
them, though that is one effect. He is reducing their interactions
with citizens, who might report them to the authorities. It is a
perfect case of harboring, but might be a weak case of concealing,
if the defendant could convince the jury that concealment was not
his purpose in housing them. 129

By the end of his opinion, Judge Posner had offered three
different glosses on harboring: (1) “deliberately safeguarding
members of a specified group from the authorities, whether through
concealment, movement to a safe location, or physical protection”; 130
(2) “materially to assist an alien to remain illegally in the United
States without publicly advertising his presence but without needing
or bothering to conceal it” (and, perhaps, offering an “inducement”
to the alien); 131 and (3) providing or offering “a known illegal alien a
secure haven, a refuge, a place to stay in which the authorities are
unlikely to be seeking him.” 132 At the same time, and to set the stage
for our subsequent analysis, he also made claims that suggest he
thinks to harbor and to shelter are similar because (a) he argued “‘to
shelter’ has an aura of protectiveness” 133 and (b) he said to harbor has
a connotation “of deliberately safeguarding members,” 134 which
seems to include an aura of protectiveness too, even if the objects
being harbored might be different or more specific than the objects
being sheltered.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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B. Corpus Analysis of the Case
From a corpus-linguistic perspective, Posner’s approach to
determining the meaning of to harbor (and potentially its similarity
to to shelter) is highly problematic for two reasons. First, while a
proper corpus-linguistic analysis of the meaning of a particular verb
(such as harbor) would indeed entail the exploration of the verb’s
arguments—e.g., the entity performing the action denoted by the
verb (usually referred to as the agent) or the entity that undergoes
some change as a result of the action denoted by the verb (usually
referred to as the patient)—Judge Posner a priori restricts his ‘data’
to a highly selective subset of patients. Judge Posner’s method fails
to (i) showcase the true variety of the direct objects of to harbor,
both in terms of the lexical items showing up in the direct object slot
of to harbor and in terms of the semantic prosody of the objects that
to harbor takes, and (ii) lead to what is likely to be the ordinary
meaning of to harbor.
Second, while a certain degree of subjective intuition is virtually
unavoidable in the comparative analysis of words, Judge Posner’s
discussion of the verbs to harbor and to shelter and how they relate to
the government’s definitions of to harbor, to shelter, and to house is
more subjective than what a proper linguistic analysis would permit.
Instead of being based on potentially falsifiable and replicable data,
the semantic characteristics Judge Posner posits are based on little
else other than his own intuitions.
A more appropriate corpus-linguistic analysis would differ in two
main ways. First, it would not be restricted to a few argument types
selected by an analyst. Rather, an analyst could generate a
concordance of the verb(s) in question and then explore all the
verbs’ argument types to arrive at a better understanding of their
usage, which is the strategy that we follow here. Second, such an
analysis would attempt to be intersubjective and replicable by
exploring all usage tokens (specific instances in which an expression
is used) of the words (in a pseudo-random sample) with an
annotation scheme that is grounded in linguistic analysis which could
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potentially be applied in a validation study. 135 Again, that is the
approach we follow here.
Specifically, we used a script in the programming language R to
retrieve all instances of the verb to harbor (including spellings with u)
and to shelter that were tagged as verbs from the 2012–2015 update
of the Corpus of Contemporary American English. 136 We obtained
453 instances of the lemma to harbor, which were then inspected
manually to identify the agent and the patient of the harboring (i.e.,
the entity that does the harboring and the entity that is harbored). 137
Each agent and patient was then classified into one of several
semantic categories that proved useful in previous corpus-semantic
work. 138 Categories include, but are not limited to, those exemplified
in (1) (for the sake of brevity, we exemplify only patients and
abbreviate the concordance lines):
(1)

a.

an area harboring the highest level of
biodiversity

[abstract]

b.

a dark continent harboring mastodons

[animate]

c.

most strains harbored genes

[genetic]

d.

a star harbored an earth-sized planet

[concrete]

e.

what shame and anger would he harbor?

[emotion/
cognition/
perception]

f.

a part of the world that harbors islamist
militants

[human]

g.

houses often harboring political action
committees

[institutions]

135. See, for example, Stefan Th. Gries & Naoki Otani, Behavioral Profiles: A CorpusBased Perspective on Synonymy and Antonymy, ICAME J., Apr. 2010, at 121, http://clu.uni
.no/icame/ij34/gries_otani.pdf, or in fact nearly every corpus-based semantic study.
136. See Mark Davies, The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA): 520
million words, 2012-2015 (2016). Available online at http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/.
137. Not all instances involved both an agent and a patient, as in agentless passives.
138. See, e.g., Stefan Th. Gries, Corpus-based Methods and Cognitive Semantics: The Many
Meanings of To Run, in CORPORA IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: CORPUS-BASED APPROACHES
TO SYNTAX AND LEXIS 57 (Stefan Th. Gries & Anatol Stefanowitsch eds., 2006).
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While the semantic classification of patients is not completely
uncontroversial, the quantitative findings are relatively clear. For to
harbor, the data show that humans (i.e., the kinds of objects Judge
Posner restricted his analysis to) are in fact quite infrequent as
patients of to harbor, indicating that Judge Posner’s results are
unrepresentative and, thus, not conducive to discovering ordinary
meaning. More precisely, we found the following relative frequencies
of occurrence of classifiable patients: emotion/cognition/perception
(44.3%) > animate (16.3%) > concrete (13.7%) > human (10.8%) >
abstract (5.9%) > genetic x (5.2%) > institution = disease = location.
This is relevant because, in order to make specific claims about the
general semantics of to harbor, one must acknowledge that most uses
of to harbor are in fact neither concerned with harboring humans in
general nor with humans considered “worthy of protection/safeguarding” in particular. Rather, most of the uses involve emotions
and biological/genetic entities, which also undercuts the postulated
connotation of protectiveness Judge Posner derived from his too
limited set of direct objects. Obviously, if one looks for a verb
followed by entities that can and maybe should be protected, a
connotation of protectiveness will emerge. In a sense, this is like
arguing that to run ordinarily means ‘manage’ because one can find
many examples such as to run a chain of stores or to run a business on
Google and one never looked for to run a race or to run a [distance
noun]. Therefore, on the one hand, most cases of to harbor are
obviously not compatible with Judge Posner’s definition. On the
other hand, such uses of to harbor are in fact very compatible with
the government’s more inclusive definition of to harbor, namely
“house a person/giving a person a place to stay” or, even better
since it is more abstract and thus more clearly covers even nonhuman patients, “providing space/a habitat for something.”
The dominance of this sense in our data in turn means that this
more general sense might well be the main or ordinary sense, or
prototype. This should mean that the burden of proof was on Posner
to show that the narrower and more specific sense of to harbor he
stipulated was in fact required to define “harbor [such] alien[s].” He
could theoretically have achieved this in two ways. First, he could
have provided data to show that our frequency-based approach to
ordinary meaning is not borne out by other, more, and/or better
data. Judge Posner, however, discussed to harbor’s semantics only on
1449
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the basis of the few selected direct objects. 139 Second, he could have
produced data showing that to harbor, when used with the human
direct objects he uses as search terms, requires a new sense, one that
is different from the general ‘providing space/a habitat for,’ because
this general one is not good enough to cover to harbor’s use in the
statute. However, Judge Posner’s approach fails at that because his
data are too limited and his argumentation is too reliant on intuition.
He shows neither that to harbor actually means what he claims nor
what the relation between to harbor and to shelter is because he never
makes an explicit comparison between the two, which could in
theory support the conclusion that the two are extremely similar
in meaning.
In particular, and with respect to the use of harbor with human
direct objects, the data we analyzed also undermine Posner’s ‘corpus’
method with regard to the semantic prosody of the objects. As
mentioned above, the expressions he chose to google are mostly only
cases that already presupposed his definition: he defines to harbor as
discussed above and then searches for to harbor + direct objects such
as fugitives, refugees, and Jews, which are direct objects of the type
that he stipulates in his definition (i.e., groups of humans that are
justifiably harbored) and which portray the agent of harboring as
positive. However, this means that his ‘analysis’ also misses the fact
that there are uses of to harbor that differ in their potential evaluative
prosody; the use of harbor enemies is one in which harboring that
kind of group of humans is probably not justified and portrays the
harborer as negative. In our data, for instance, we found eighteen
cases that are arguably ‘not to be protected, not worthy of
protection, or harboring.’ These cases include terrorists, bandits,
rebels, militants, pedophile priest, and more. In contrast, we found
only nine patients of the type Posner restricted his analysis to, namely
ones that are ‘to be protected, worthy of protection, or harboring,’
which include Jews, some dedicated people, many of the priests, and a
minor. Only four of our 453 instances involved harboring fugitives.
More importantly, the examples of to harbor we have with our wider
search did not all involve “safeguarding from the authorities,”
suggesting that his definition is too specific and that the more

139.
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general definition of to harbor implied by all the nonhuman
harborees may be sufficient.
Let us finally return to the question of the potential difference
between to harbor and to shelter, which, according to Posner, the
government considered synonymous, and to both of which Posner
attributed a meaning component of protectiveness or safe-guarding.
To illustrate the kind of comparison one could employ, the same
kind of procedure we applied to to harbor was then applied to the
325 matches of the verb lemma to shelter. The distribution of its
patients is quite different from that of to harbor: human (60.6%) >
concrete (15.5%) > animate (10.4%) > abstract (5.2%) > location =
emotion/cognition/perception. When submitted to a simple
statistical test (viz. a chi-squared test for independence), we find a
statistically significant difference between the kinds of things that are
harbored and sheltered. The biggest effects are: (i) to harbor prefers
emotion/cognition/perception (in all registers) >> genetic x (mostly
in academic writing) > animate; and (ii) to shelter prefers human (in
all registers) >> [not expressed] = location = concrete. The data thus
shows that the two verbs are indeed quite different in usage and, by
implication, in meaning. This does not support the government’s
view that to harbor and to shelter are synonymous, but it suggests—
maybe somewhat ironically—that to shelter is used in a way that
Judge Posner implied to harbor would be used in, namely, mostly
with direct objects that are human, concrete objects, and animals.
The current study of to harbor and to shelter could be made
corpus-linguistically more sophisticated. For instance, part of Judge
Posner’s argument is concerned with whether the additions of
harboring and concealing to the statute in the 1952 amendments do
in fact make the statute more precise or comprehensive, or both.
This kind of question essentially boils down to a quantification of a
semantic similarity question, which in corpus linguistics can be
operationalized in terms of the overlap of (significant) collocates. In
what follows, we briefly describe the underlying logic of this
approach and what it might look like in the present case.
As briefly mentioned above, most corpus-linguistic work assumes
that distributional similarity in corpora (i.e., naturally occurring
speech and writing) reflects functional similarity, where functional is
typically a broad term for semantic, discoursal, register, and
information-structural similarity. That means that the similarity of
1451
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words x and y can be quantified based on how similar the words are
to each other that occur either in context windows, in syntactically
defined slots, or in textually defined positions around x and y. For
instance, to determine whether there is any functional difference
between the words alphabetic and alphabetical (a question native
speakers of English are routinely unable to answer), one could
proceed as follows:
•
•
•

•

•

determine the nouns that follow alphabetic at least once;
determine the nouns that follow alphabetical at least once;
for each noun type attested, determine its frequencies after
alphabetic and alphabetical as well as its overall frequency in
the corpus. This will also determine how many collocates in
percent alphabetic and alphabetical share, and the higher that
proportion and the higher the semantic similarity of the
collocates (as compared to, say, randomly chosen adjectives
as a baseline control condition), the higher the two
adjectives’ similarity;
for each noun type attested after at least one of the two
adjectives, create the following co-occurrence table
of frequencies:
Alphabetic

Alphabetical

Total

some noun type

A

B

a+b

all other noun
types

C

D

c+d

Total

a+c

b+d

a+b+c+d

Compute an association score from this table, such as the
log-likelihood ratio or Delta P to quantify which of the two
adjectives is associated how strongly to each noun collocate
(compared to the other of the two adjectives).

A statistical analysis of (i) collocate-overlap statistics and (ii)
association scores of so-called distinctive collocates can then help to
identify the overall similarity of words as well as the nature of their
functional differences. In the case of alphabetic(al), for instance, the
semantic difference can best be characterized by the two adjectives’
antonyms. According to the corpus data, the opposite of alphabetic is
1452

4.GRIESSLOCUM_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1417

4/26/2018 4:01 PM

Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics

numeric, whereas the opposite of alphabetical is unordered. 140 In our
case, it would be straightforward to apply a similar logic to to harbor
and to shelter (as well as the other verbs relevant to the statute, such
as to conceal and to shield) to determine to what degree, if any, Judge
Posner’s account of the similarity between to harbor and to shelter
is valid.
Perhaps Judge Posner should be commended for his recognition
of the flaws associated with judicial reliance on dictionaries and his
attempt to substitute an empirically based method of language study
instead of citing to, for example, his own experience and knowledge
of language or to common sense. Nevertheless, the corpus analysis
detailed above demonstrates that Judge Posner’s Google searches
were insufficient to study what to harbor means because the search
terms he used were not representative of the ordinary uses of to
harbor (at least as operationalized by frequency). Our analysis thus
indicates that the determination of ordinary meaning is susceptible
to error when it is based on judges’ intuitions about how words are
ordinarily used. Our corpus analysis should not, however, be
interpreted as an argument that the result in Costello was incorrect.
Inferences from the context relevant to a statute are crucial to
interpretation, and are often intertwined with legal concerns. 141 It
might be that contextual inferences pointed to an interpretation of
the statute that would not allow for conviction based on Costello’s
actions. Nevertheless, if courts make general claims about language
meaning as part of an ordinary meaning determination, as Judge
Posner did in Costello, the sequential nature of interpretation
(whereby initial indications of meaning are shaped by contextual
concerns) becomes flawed if those semantic judgments
are inaccurate. 142

140. See Stefan Th. Gries, Testing the Sub-Test: An Analysis of English -ic and -ical
Adjectives, 8 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 31, 41–42 (2003).
141. See supra notes 29–39 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
context to legal interpretation).
142. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text (describing the sequential nature
of interpretation).
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IV. SMITH V. UNITED STATES
A. Description of the Case
The infamous case, Smith v. United States, 143 involved the
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which (remarkably for a
routine criminal statute providing a penalty enhancement and
presenting no constitutional issues) has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court on multiple occasions. 144 Section 924(c)(1)(A)
provides for enhanced punishment if the defendant “uses” a firearm
“during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.” 145 In
Smith, the defendant offered to trade an automatic weapon to an
undercover officer for cocaine. 146 The Court held that the defendant
was subject to the sentencing enhancement because the statute does
not require that the firearm have been used as a weapon. 147
The Court explained that “when a word is not defined by
statute,” as most are not, courts “normally construe it in accord with
its ordinary or natural meaning.” 148 The Court stated that
exchanging a firearm for drugs “can be described as ‘use’ within the
everyday meaning of that term.” 149 The Court consulted two
dictionaries regarding the word use and concluded that it means “to
employ” or “to derive service from.” 150 The Court rejected the
argument that uses has a reduced scope in § 924(c)(1)(A) because it
appears alongside the word firearm. 151 The Court reasoned that “[i]t
is one thing to say that the ordinary meaning of ‘uses a firearm’
143. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469.
144. See Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007); Muscarello v. United States, 524
U.S. 125 (1998), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat.
3469; Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, as recognized in United States v. O’Brien, 560
U.S. 218 (2010).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). The statute also applies to anyone who “carries”
or, since an amendment to the statute in 1998, “possesses” a firearm “during and in relation
to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.” Id. In the cases described in this section, the defendants
were all charged with “use” of the firearm.
146. Smith, 508 U.S. at 225–26.
147. See id. at 240.
148. Id. at 228. Because the defendant traded a “machinegun,” the sentence was thirty
years. Id. at 227.
149. Id. at 228.
150. Id. at 229.
151. Id. at 229–33.

1454

4.GRIESSLOCUM_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1417

4/26/2018 4:01 PM

Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics

includes using a firearm as a weapon . . . [b]ut it is quite another to
conclude that, as a result, the phrase also excludes any other use.” 152
Thus, because “one can use a firearm in a number of ways. That one
example of ‘use’ is the first to come to mind . . . does not preclude
us from recognizing that there are other ‘uses’ that qualify as
well.” 153 Due to the broad meaning of use, the Court concluded that
the statute’s language “sweeps broadly, punishing any ‘us[e]’ of a
firearm, so long as the use is ‘during and in relation to’ a drug
trafficking offense.” 154 Therefore, the Court reasoned, “[I]t is both
reasonable and normal to say that [the defendant] ‘used’ his MAC10 in his drug trafficking offense by trading it for cocaine.” 155 In the
Court’s view, if Congress had intended that the firearm be used as a
weapon in order for the enhanced punishment to apply, it could have
included the words “as a weapon” in the statute. 156
In dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the Court’s failure to properly
consider context in determining the ordinary meaning of use. First,
Justice Scalia pointed out the “elastic” nature of the word use. 157
Second, he argued that “[t]o use an instrumentality ordinarily means
to use it for its intended purpose.” 158 Thus, “to speak of ‘using a
firearm’ is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a
weapon.” 159 Justice Scalia reasoned that “[w]hen someone asks, ‘Do
you use a cane?,’ he is not inquiring whether you have your
grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he
wants to know whether you walk with a cane.” 160 In Justice Scalia’s
view, the words “as a weapon” were “reasonably implicit” from the
context of the statute. 161
In a similar case, in 2007 the Court held in Watson v. United
States, 162 that a person who trades drugs for a gun does not “‘use[]’ a
firearm ‘during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.’” 163
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 230 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 241–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 244.
Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007).
Id. at 76.
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In Smith the Court emphasized the dictionary meaning of “any” and
discounted Justice Scalia’s examples that were designed to
distinguish between the ordinary meaning of a phrase and the
Court’s reliance on the dictionary definition of a single word. In
contrast, the Court emphasized in Watson that “the meaning of the
verb ‘uses’ has to turn on the language as we normally speak it.” 164
In the Court’s view, the proper interpretation must “appeal to the
ordinary” because “there is no other source of a reasonable inference
about what Congress understood when writing or what its words
will bring to the mind of a careful reader.” 165 Based on its own
understanding of common usage, the Court reasoned as follows:
The Government may say that a person ‘uses’ a firearm simply by
receiving it in a barter transaction, but no one else would. A boy
who trades an apple to get a granola bar is sensibly said to use the
apple, but one would never guess which way this commerce
actually flowed from hearing that the boy used the granola. 166

While the Court in Smith indicated that a broad meaning should
be given the provision considering its purpose of combating the
dangerous combination of drugs and guns, 167 the Court in Watson
declined to give such considerations significance without providing
any real discussion. 168 Furthermore, the Court in Watson failed to
recognize that unlike the verbs sell or give, use is not unidirectional.
As the Court noted in its earlier decision in Bailey v. United States,
one of the dictionary definitions of use is “[t]o convert to one’s
service,” and another was “to avail oneself of.” 169 Certainly, if one
wanted to rely on a dictionary definition, the receipt of a firearm as
one’s possession means that the item has been “convert[ed] to
one’s service.” 170

164. Id. at 79.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240–41 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of
Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469.
168. Watson, 552 U.S. 74.
169. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at
228–29), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 State. 3469,
as recognized in United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010).
170. Id. Of course, such a conclusion should not be based on a dictionary definition, but
we make this point only to highlight the inconsistencies in the Court’s opinions.
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Note that the Court in Smith, when presented with Justice
Scalia’s dissent pointing out that the common understanding of use a
firearm is ‘discharging a firearm,’ does not argue that Justice Scalia is
incorrect about the ordinary or common meaning of use (v.).
Instead, the Court retreats to a position that might polemically be
paraphrased as follows: ‘Just because a more specific meaning may be
compatible with the dictionary definition we cite earlier, and may in
fact be the most common use (we [the Court] seem to concede this
since we do not provide any counterevidence to that claim), does not
mean that we cannot choose the more abstract dictionary meaning
we prefer and for whose ordinariness or commonness we simply do
not provide any evidence.’ Somewhat ironically, the Court then
rejects Justice Scalia’s argument of how one might use a cane by
stating: “To be sure, ‘use’ as an adornment in a hallway is not the
first ‘use’ of a cane that comes to mind. But certainly, it does not
follow that the only ‘use’ to which a cane might be put is assisting
one’s grandfather in walking.” 171
That is to say, the same Court that a few paragraphs earlier
argued that “words not defined in statute should be given ordinary
or common meaning” then rejects Justice Scalia’s argument, which is
essentially based on operationalizing ordinariness or commonness as
‘what comes to mind first.’ One is tempted to ask pointedly, what
definition of ordinariness the Court is assuming when it rejects
Justice Scalia’s operationalization of ordinariness and instead
provides an arcane example of caning in the U.S. Senate in 1856? 172
B. Corpus Analysis of the Case
There are various legitimate and persuasive bases on which to
criticize the Court’s opinion in Smith, including the methodological
inconsistencies between the opinions in Smith and Watson discussed
above. For instance, although the Court viewed the interpretive
dispute as requiring a definition of the ordinary meaning of use, a
dictionary definition cannot answer the question of how the
defendant must use the firearm within the meaning of the provision.
Instead, the interpretive difficulties can more precisely be framed as
arising from the provision’s underspecification of use. The
171.
172.

Smith, 508 U.S. at 230.
See id. at 230–31.
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underspecification is due to ellipsis, which is a “truncated or partial
linguistic form” “in which constituents normally occurring in a
sentence are superficially absent, licensed by structurally present
prior antecedents.” 173 For example, a case of verb phrase ellipsis
occurs in the sentence: Max went to the store, and Oscar did, too. 174
Cognitive scientists have demonstrated via corpus analysis that
expressions with fully specified event structures are rare (i.e., are
elided) “when the event is commonly associated with the noun.” 175
In normal usage, a fully specified event structure is used less than five
percent of the time. 176 Furthermore, “[f]ull event structures tend to
occur only with less predictable activities.” 177 Thus, one critique of
Smith could focus on the Court’s mistaken focus on use without
understanding ellipsis and how full event structures are typically
made explicit only when referencing less predictable activities (such
as using a firearm as currency). 178
Even apart from the ellipsis issue, a corpus-linguistic analysis of
use paints a picture that is very much at odds with the very general
meaning adopted by the Court in Smith on the basis of dictionary
definitions. Specifically, the Court adopted definitions of use from
Webster’s Dictionary as well as Black’s Law Dictionary, which raises
two kinds of problems. 179 First, some of the definitions—those in
Black’s Law Dictionary in particular—are somewhat circular, as when
use is defined as “[t]o make use of” or “to utilize,” given how these
supposed definitions of use in fact rely on derivatives of use (v.),
namely use (n.) and utilize. Second, and more importantly, the
definitions adopted are too general. For instance, consider how the
proposed paraphrase of use, “to employ,” can be used in contexts
(e.g., “he employs many women in his restaurant”) in which use
173. Robert May, Ellipsis, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 1094 (2003).
174. See id. The sentence without ellipsis would read: Max went to the store, and Oscar
went to the store, too.
175. Matthew J. Traxler, Brian McElree, Rihana S. Williams & Martin J. Pickering,
Context Effects in Coercion: Evidence from Eye Movements, 53 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 1, 2
(2005) [hereinafter Traxler et al.]. “An event is a type of situation . . . in which something
happens.” MURPHY & KOSKELA, supra note 9, at 65.
176. See Traxler et al., supra note 175.
177. Id.
178. See Brian G. Slocum, Linguistics and ‘Ordinary Meaning’ Determinations, 33
STATUTE L. REV. 39, 64 (2012).
179. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228–29 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of
Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469.
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would either change the meaning or would have to be given an
unordinary meaning.
To provide more objective evidence for Justice Scalia’s
contention regarding the meaning of use (v.) in general and use a
firearm in particular, we again turned to the 2012–2015 update of
the Corpus of Contemporary American English. 180 Using another R
script, we found 21,164 instances where the lemma use is used as a
verb (search tags for the regex: “^v”) and followed by a determiner
or
possessive
pronoun
(search
tags
for
the
regex:
“^(dd[12]|at1?|appge)$”) and optionally followed by an adjective
(search tags for the regex: “jj[rt]?”) and followed by a noun (search
tags for the regex: “nn[12]”).
This data set was explored on two different levels. First, we
looked for all instances where the subsequent context contained a
small set of weapon nouns. As a result of this set of searches, we
found 161 instances in which the direct object of use was a noun
phrase whose head noun lemma was either gun (or derivatives like
handgun or shotgun; 64 cases), rifle (16 cases), firearm (10 cases),
pistol (7 cases), or weapon (62 cases). Some of these cases of weapon
include scenarios that do not refer to firearms (some additional
examples of weapon nouns were included because those rows
featured one or more of the above search words later in the
subsequent context). Sixteen instances were found in which the
direct object of use was a non-weapon noun (e.g., a van, a stolen car,
his foot) deployed “as a weapon.”
Two instances had to be discarded because closer scrutiny
revealed that their use of weapon nouns was metaphorical in nature
or did not involve a gun as a weapon (e.g., a caulking gun), leaving
us with 159 instances. We then checked that the cases we studied
were sufficiently dispersed. 181 Specifically, we checked how many
180. See Davies, supra note 136.
181. As is well-known among corpus linguists, using only frequency as a measure of the
commonness of a word, an expression, or a meaning is treacherous since words with very
similar or even identical frequencies in a corpus can be very unevenly dispersed. For instance,
in the Brown corpus, a one million-word corpus of general written American English of the
1960s, the words “‘staining”‘ and “‘enormous”‘ are equally frequent (37 times), but the
former occurs in only one of the 500 samples the corpus consists of, whereas the latter occurs
in 36 of the 500 samples, which means it is much more likely to be used/seen by the
population the Brown corpus represents. Similar examples abound in other corpora and
dispersion has been shown to be a better predictor of word recognition times than frequency,
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instances of our use DET (ADJ/N) WEAPON-N examples were
attested in each of the twenty parts of the corpus. This was done to
ensure that whatever results we might have found were not due to a
high degree of concentration of cases in one corpus part, register, or
genre, given how that would undermine any claims of
representativity and ordinary usage. We computed a measure of
dispersion called DP, which ranges from zero (an element is perfectly
evenly distributed) to one (an element is completely unevenly
distributed) and obtained a value of 0.31. 182 This value is on the
‘even’ side of the continuum but can be understood better when one
considers the words that score comparable values in general corpora.
Specifically, the value is comparable to that scored by words such as
shark, doorsteps, cycling, Athens, and funniest in the British National
Corpus (a 100-million words corpus of British English from the
1990s). These are all ‘standard words’ that any normal native speaker
of English and most learners of English would be quite familiar with,
which supports the notion that the instances of use DET (ADJ/N)
WEAPON-N are widely used and, thus, representative.
We then checked the 159 instances for whether the phrase use
DET (ADJ/N) WEAPON-N referred to an instance in which the
referent of the weapon-noun was used for barter. There was not a
single occurrence of such a case. More specifically, approximately
88% of all cases were clear cases of ‘not barter.’ Most involved
discharging a weapon or brandishing it for deterrence, while the
remaining approximately 12% involved cases that were coded as
‘probably not barter’ in the most conservative way. These include
cases in which any reader or comprehender would have to bend over
backwards semantically to impose a potential, but really rather
unlikely, ‘barter’ reading such as the following instances from
our data:
see, for example, James S. Adelman, Gordon D.A. Brown & José F. Quesada, Contextual
Diversity, Not Word Frequency, Determines Word-Naming and Lexical Decision Times, 17
PSYCHOL. SCI. 814 (2006); Stefan Th. Gries, Dispersions and Adjusted Frequencies in Corpora,
13 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 403 (2008); Stefan Th. Gries, Dispersions and Adjusted
Frequencies in Corpora: Further Explorations, in CORPUS-LINGUISTIC APPLICATIONS:
CURRENT STUDIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 197 (Stefan Th. Gries, Stefanie Wulff & Mark Davies
eds., 2010), which is why it is also used in frequency dictionaries such as MARK DAVIES & DEE
GARDNER, A FREQUENCY DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH: WORD
SKETCHES, COLLOCATES, AND THEMATIC LISTS (2010).
182. See Gries, supra note 181.
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(1) there is no talk of whoever is found guilty of having
used these weapons should go to the International
Criminal Court.
(2) negotiated the social context of inner-city violence while they
were on the “outside.” We asked questions regarding
“disrespect” as well as the following questions: Did they
carry firearms? In what situations would they use a firearm?
(3) That’s why I keep receipts, and have myself audited every
year. If they want me off the job they’d better use a gun.
Don’t tell Vicky I said that.
Surely, in example (2) the intended meaning is not to ask in
which contexts inner-city gang members would use their guns
for barter.
Although undoubtedly complicated to nonexperts, the above
analysis is insufficient. Recent developments in theoretical linguistics,
in particular cognitive or usage-based Linguistics and Construction
Grammar, have shown that the meaning of linguistic expressions
derives not solely from the meanings of lexical items and how they
are structurally combined in sentences but also from grammatical
patterns, which have meanings on their own. 183 For instance, the
sentence John fignorpled Mary the book would be understood by most
speakers as involving transfer of the book from John to Mary, even
though this understanding cannot possibly arise from the verb simply
because the verb does not exist, so a speaker of English could not
have learned its meaning. Rather, it arises from the grammatical
pattern Vfignorpled NPMary NPthe book. It is therefore necessary to determine
whether the ‘barter’ reading stipulated by the Supreme Court may
reside not in use DET (ADJ/N) WEAPON-N, but in a
constructional pattern more abstract than that. Thus, we also
explored additional levels of granularity/resolution. We re-ordered
all 21,000 matches of use from above into a random order and
annotated the direct objects of use until we reached 159 objects that
could be classified as concrete objects (this is because guns/firearms
are concrete objects and because we found 159 uses of weapon
nouns as discussed above). We then determined for each item in this
183. See ADELE E. GOLDBERG, CONSTRUCTIONS: A CONSTRUCTION GRAMMAR
APPROACH TO ARGUMENT STRUCTURE (1995); ADELE E. GOLDBERG, CONSTRUCTIONS AT
WORK: THE NATURE OF GENERALIZATION IN LANGUAGE (2006).
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(admittedly small but completely randomly selected) sample of
matches of use whether the use + DO pattern was meant to convey
‘use for barter.’ Again, not a single occurrence of use + DO conveyed
that meaning.
In sum, corpus-linguistic analysis revealed that the Court’s
interpretation of use + DO is incompatible with the ordinarymeaning approach the Court claims it is applying. Certainly, our
analysis does not dispute the possibility that use + Concrete Object
can mean ‘use the concrete object as barter/currency.’ Undoubtedly,
examples of such usage can be created that are both grammatical and
comprehensible. The point is that such examples are not ordinary, as
the above corpus-linguistic analysis reveals. Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Smith is strongly supported on three different levels of
linguistic/constructional abstraction and on the basis of widely
dispersed data. In our data randomly sampled from COCA,
(1) instances of use followed by a direct object involve many
cases that are not concrete objects or other entities that
would not straightforwardly evoke an interpretation of use as
‘use for barter;’
(2) instances of use followed by a direct object referring to a
concrete object never evoked an interpretation of use as ‘use
for barter;’
(3) instances of use followed by a weapon noun never evoke an
interpretation of use as ‘use for barter.’
As in our examination of Costello, we do not claim that our
corpus analysis here proves that the decision in Smith was incorrect.
Rather, the point is that the Court’s general claims about language
meaning, which the Court indicated dictated its decision, were
flawed and, in fact, supported the defendant’s interpretation. If the
Court had a more accurate understanding of the ordinary meaning
of the relevant language but nonetheless still wished to reach the
same interpretation, it would be compelled to offer quite strong
inferences from the statutory context in order to justify its
interpretation (thereby demonstrating the sequential nature of
interpretation). 184 If the Court could not justify an interpretation
184. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text (describing the sequential nature
of interpretation).
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based on such contextual inferences, it would be obliged to interpret
the statute in favor of the defendant.
V. THE NO-VEHICLES-IN-THE-PARK HYPOTHETICAL
A. Description of the Hypothetical
Our third vehicle for illustrating corpus analysis of statutes
involves an enduring and famous legal hypothetical, H. L. A. Hart’s
no-vehicles-in-the-park scenario. 185 The hypothetical asks the
following questions: “A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into
the public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about
bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are
these, as we say, to be called ‘vehicles’ for the purpose of the rule
or not?” 186
The hypothetical classically frames the challenges inherent in
categorizing objects and defining words (such as vehicle) and the
consequent fuzziness often labeled as vagueness) associated with
such attempts. Categorization is a psychological process whereby
people, including judges, make judgments about whether an object
falls within a given concept. The ability to categorize is an integral
aspect of childhood development. Early in their development
humans demonstrate the ability to countenance differences in order
to generalize and form categories based on similarities. 187 The ability
to categorize is beneficial because it allows for the organization of
knowledge through the creation of taxonomies that include smaller
classes within larger ones (e.g., one specific horse < a breed of horses
such as Cleveland Bay < Horses < Animals). As such, categorization
is part of the process of inductive generalization, where, for example,
knowing that a creature has features similar to recognized members
of the category ‘horse’ enables one to categorize the creature as
a horse.
In discussing his no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical, Hart
recognized that “[t]here must be a core of settled meaning”
associated with general words like vehicle, “but there will be, as well,
185. The hypothetical was discussed earlier in this Article. See supra notes 43–47 and
accompanying text.
186. Hart, supra note 44, at 607.
187. Vladimir M. Sloutsky, The Role of Similarity in the Development of Categorization, 7
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 246, 246 (2003).
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a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously
applicable nor obviously ruled out.” 188 The fuzziness associated with
most natural language concepts, such as ‘vehicle,’ does not
undermine most day-to-day verbal interactions, in which a high
degree of precision is not necessary to successful communication.
The requirements of the legal system, however, are different.
Interpretive questions (e.g., does a certain object fall within the
scope of the concept ‘vehicle’) need definite “yes” or “no” answers,
and frequently the dispute will involve some object at the margins of
the relevant concept (e.g., a car without an engine). 189 Despite the
human language faculty and its natural ability to categorize, as well
as the widespread intuition that language users are naturally experts
on the interpretation of their native language, issues of language and
meaning—particularly categorization—have long challenged judges
and commentators. 190
Although Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical is famous
for its illustration of the difficulties of categorization, he does not
provide any real explanation of how an interpreter identifies the
“core of settled meaning” or the parameters of the category. 191 That
is, he does not explain how a judge should identify criteria for
determining membership in a category such as that denoted by
vehicle. Such identification is crucial, however, to the ordinary
meaning doctrine. As discussed earlier, a judge might well approach
the meaning of the no-vehicles-in-the park provision by consulting a
dictionary definition of vehicle, the key term in the provision. 192 In
part due to Justice Scalia’s influence on the Court, judicial reliance
on dictionaries is extensive and has dramatically increased since
the 1980s. 193
In fact, in his 2012 book, Justice Scalia (as well as his co-author
Bryan Garner) analyzes the no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical and
argues that judges should consult dictionary definitions in

188. Hart, supra note 44, at 607.
189. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text (discussing the bivalency of the
legal system).
190. See SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 213–76.
191. See Hart, supra note 44.
192. See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text (describing the judiciary’s reliance
on dictionaries).
193. See supra note 86.
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determining the meaning of vehicle. 194 However, Justice Scalia rejects
the dictionary definitions as being too broad and inclusive, and
creates instead (without citing any linguistic authority or analysis) his
own definition, claiming that it would be sufficiently definite so as to
resolve questions regarding the extension of vehicle. 195 He rejects a
broad dictionary definition that describes a vehicle as “a means of
carrying or transporting something,” 196 along with another defining
the term as follows: “A means of conveyance, usu. with wheels, for
transporting people, goods, etc.; a car, cart, truck, carriage, sledge,
etc.” or “[a]ny means of carriage of transport; a receptacle in which
something is placed in order to be moved.” 197 Scalia concedes that
“[a]nything that is ever called a vehicle (in the relevant sense) would
fall within these definitions.” 198 Instead, Justice Scalia creates his own
definition: “The proper colloquial meaning in our view (not all of
them are to be found in dictionaries) is simply a sizable wheeled
conveyance (as opposed to one of any size that is motorized).” 199
Armed with his self-created definition, Scalia concludes that
“remote-controlled model cars, baby carriages, [and] tricycles”
would not fall under it. 200 But how does one decide whether an
object is “sizable” enough to qualify as a vehicle? If the definition of
vehicle sets forth necessary and sufficient conditions that include
anything that is (1) sizable, (2) wheeled, and (3) a conveyance, then
there must be some size threshold for the category. However, Justice
Scalia does not offer any standard for evaluating what is “sizable.”
Notwithstanding his goal of demonstrating an interpretive
methodology that will produce consistent answers across judges,
Justice Scalia indicates uncertainty concerning the application of his
definition to bicycles, indicating that they are “perhaps” not vehicles
(albeit confirming later that they are not vehicles), and Segways,
indicating that they are “perhaps” vehicles. 201 Why the distinction
194. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 36–37.
195. See id. at 37.
196. Id. (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1386 (11th
ed. 2003)).
197. Id. (quoting THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3554 (4th
ed. 1993)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 37–38.
201. Id. at 38.

1465

4.GRIESSLOCUM_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/26/2018 4:01 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

between the two (similarly sized) objects? Justice Scalia does not
offer an explanation, nor does he explain the basis for his
uncertainty. Furthermore, apparently a scooter is not a vehicle (and
neither is a motorized wheelchair) but a moped is. 202
The long-standing no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical illustrates
the inherent fuzziness of language. A major problem, as Justice
Scalia’s analysis illustrates, is that, it is in tension with the common
motivation of judges to define words in such a way as to avoid
uncertainty in application. Doing so assists the judge in reaching the
required “yes” or “no” answer in what seems like an objective
manner. 203 This may involve selecting a dictionary (or in Justice
Scalia’s case, his own intuitions about language) and treating one of
the definitions as though it sets forth necessary and sufficient
conditions that, when met, guarantee membership in the category
represented by the word. 204 The resulting decision may sometimes be
correct, in the sense that the result in the case corresponds with the
ordinary meaning of the language, but it will not be based on an
accurate understanding of language.
B. Proposed Corpus Analyses of the Hypothetical
Fortunately, the meaning of vehicle presents an issue of lexical
semantics to which corpus analysis can be applied. Despite the
seemingly clear issue of meaning Hart’s simple statute presents,
however, the corpus analysis is not straightforward. The
differentiation of (suspected) near synonyms (relevant in the Costello
analysis) or the classification of arguments with which, for instance, a
verb is used (relevant in the Smith analysis), are by now wellestablished matters in corpus linguistics. The situation is different,
though, when it comes to determining the extension of a category
such as that denoted by vehicle to determine whether a certain object
in question (e.g., a Segway or a lawnmower) would fall under the
category label. The initial, and intuitive, idea of retrieving sentences
such as “[some noun] is a vehicle” to obtain a truly comprehensive
set of objects that count as vehicles seems bound to fail in all but the

202.
203.
204.
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For a critique of such practice see SOLAN, supra note 87, at 50–80.
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largest corpora. As a result, a more sophisticated approach is needed.
We outline some proposals below.
It seems advisable to approach category extension by recognizing
that the notion of a corpus can refer to more than collections of texts
(written or transcribed spoken data that occurred naturally) in
(Unicode) text that may feature linguistic annotation. For instance,
there is nothing that rules out extending the notion of corpus to
include auditory data (spoken language) and textual data (written
language) as well as visual data (in the form of images). Textual data
are also processed visually, even if they are visual representations of a
conventionalized set of symbols. For example, the linguist Levshina
discusses a study that consisted of the following steps:
(1) the compilation of a corpus of images labeled as Stuhl
(German for chair) and Sessel (German for armchair) from
online furniture catalogs;
(2) their annotation for a variety of features describing their
physical and functional characteristics;
(3) the computation of a multiple correspondence analysis
(MCA), which explores the multi-feature annotation of
images for commonalities/correlations and returns
dimensions that underlie, and hopefully motivate in an
interpretable way, the distinction of, in this case, Stuhl
and Sessel. 205
It would be methodologically straightforward to apply a similar
logic to concepts such as vehicle by annotating images of vehicles and
other things (as a control group) for features and then have an MCA
determine which features or dimensions distinguish vehicles from
semantically neighboring terms. Doing so might reveal that while a
lawnmower, for example, has wheels and is operated by a human, it
does not transport humans or goods (at least not as its primary
purpose) and, thus, should not be considered a vehicle. This method
is potentially laborious and time-consuming, but once features and
data are chosen, it is objective and replicable. Furthermore, the
categorization of images and photos by ordinary users of the

205.

See NATALIA LEVSHINA, HOW TO DO LINGUISTICS WITH R: DATA EXPLORATION
(2015).
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Internet is, arguably, less likely to deviate from ordinary usage than
what a judge makes up in his or her chambers.
Another method would involve linguistically and psychologically
more sophisticated ways of operationalizing the notions of category
membership and prototypicality. For instance, frequency can, but
need not, be a good predictor of prototypicality. 206 However, not
only is it useful to add dispersion to this definition, but some
linguists, psychologists, and many other cognitive scientists also
argue that a prototype is better defined as an abstract entity that
consists of the combination of the most salient attributes of the
category. The most salient attributes for a category are those with a
high cue validity for the category. 207 The cue validity of an attribute
A of object X with regard to a category C is the conditional
probability of X being a member of category C if or given that X has
attribute A: p(C|A). In other words, a robin (the object X) is a
“good” bird (the category C) because it has many of the attributes
A1-n that are highly predictive of something being a bird (e.g., if
something has a beak (A1), it is most likely a bird; if something (also)
has feathers (A2), it is most likely a bird), not because we encounter
it so frequently or talk about it so frequently (although frequency
and even dispersion may of course help in making something
seem prototypical). 208
Based on the analysis above, the question of what falls within the
category of ‘vehicle’ can be approached both corpus-linguistically
and experimentally. One can retrieve clauses such as “[some noun] is
a vehicle” from a hopefully large and representative corpus, not to
sample all of the nouns one obtains as a set of category members,
but rather to note the attributes they possess and compute the cue
validities of those attributes for the category ‘vehicle.’ Armed with
these, we can compose a prototype of the category ‘vehicle.’ We can
also quantify for every entity we consider a candidate for category
membership—Segways, golf carts, scooters, etc.—both how many
attributes of the category ‘vehicle’ it possesses, and their cue
206.
207.

See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text (discussing frequency).
See Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND
CATEGORIZATION 27, 27–48 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara Lloyd eds., 1978); John R. Taylor,
Prototype Theory, in 1 SEMANTICS 643, 643–64 (Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger &
Paul Portner eds., 2011).
208. For an explanation of dispersion see supra note 172.
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validities. On those grounds, one is likely to find that a Tesla Model
S is a vehicle even though it does not have an internal combustion
engine and that a baby stroller is probably not a vehicle even though
though it has four wheels and conveys a passenger. Experimental
data from psycholinguistic testing can enhance such corpus data by
helping validate attributes’ relevance for categories or by providing
examples of vehicles that the corpus data did not provide.
While the above suggestions are programmatic at this stage, they
do indicate that corpus-linguistic methods (as well as complementary
methods from neighboring disciplines) can provide data that is
relevant to enduring issues of statutory interpretation like the
fuzziness inherent in natural language words such as vehicle. Such
data is certainly more accurate than the unsupported intuitions relied
on by Justice Scalia in his analysis. 209 Nevertheless, as in the cases
analyzed earlier, we do not claim that corpus analysis should by itself
set the meaning of a statute. A court may well rely on some extratextual inference from context that may shape whatever meaning of
vehicle it adopts. For example, a court may, and often does, adopt a
meaning based on some circumstance relevant to the purpose of the
statute. For example, a judge might believe that ambulances and
other emergency vehicles fall under the ordinary meaning of vehicle
but may be convinced that they should not be excluded from the
park in Hart’s hypothetical). Such examples do not undermine the
general notion that corpus analysis can help a judge decide whether a
certain definition is compatible with the ordinary meaning of vehicle.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of interpretive methodologies and the importance of pragmatic inferences from context
(which are often intertwined with legal concerns), the ordinary
meaning doctrine is a fundamental aspect of legal interpretation. As
such, the semantic meanings of words act as a constraint on
permissible interpretations, making linguistic insights from corpora
relevant to the questions courts explicitly or implicitly ask when
interpreting legal texts. Because ordinary meaning must in some
sense be generalizable across contexts, not shaped by legal concerns,
209. See supra notes 194–202 and accompanying text (describing Justice Scalia’s analysis
of Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical).
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it would seem to be subject in some way to the empirical verification
that corpus analysis can provide.
Nevertheless, it is important to properly assess the limitations of
a determinant of meaning like corpus analysis that cannot account
for the full context of the relevant statute. Its inability to take into
account the full context of a statute means that corpus analysis
cannot by itself provide conclusive meanings to legal texts. Unlike
some other determinants of meaning such as legislative history, the
main function of corpus analysis is to provide data about word
meanings that cut across contexts. While such information can of
course be useful, meaning is often fixed in other ways, such as
through consideration of the structure or context of the relevant
statute. Furthermore, corpus analysis cannot answer inherently
normative questions such as the proper standard for designating
some permissible meaning as the ordinary meaning. Instead, it can
only provide data relevant to whatever standard is set by courts.
Even though corpus linguistics can provide linguistic facts useful
to legal interpretation, a fair amount of sophistication is needed in
order to perform the work competently. Judges are experts in
interpreting the law, but such knowledge is orthogonal to corpus
linguistics. An understanding of how law functions and the role of
interpretive principles (many of which reflect legal concerns and
values) does not make a judge (or legal scholar) an expert in the
academic field of linguistics. The training of linguists often involves
methods specifically designed to identify and describe the meaning of
expressions and how to experimentally and statistically counter
cognitive biases. Judges and lawyers do not currently receive such
training. Not surprisingly, judges frequently make basic mistakes
about how language functions (let alone mistakes concerning
sophisticated linguistic methodologies). 210 To think that lawyers and
judges can easily obtain the necessary corpus linguistics knowledge
brings to mind Tushnet’s “the ‘lawyer as astrophysicist’ assumption,”
whereby he criticizes the oft-prevalent notion among lawyers and
legal academics that “the generalist training of lawyers allows any

210. See generally SOLAN, supra note 10 (describing judicial mistakes regarding both
basic and difficult issues of language).
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lawyer to read a text on astrophysics over the weekend and launch a
rocket on Monday.” 211
At this time, it is highly doubtful that the cost-benefit analysis of
acquiring the knowledge necessary to perform corpus linguistics
competently favors widespread judicial adoption. Nevertheless,
publicizing the kind of knowledge that can be gained from linguistic
work may encourage judges to avail themselves of the services of
linguists or, more likely, gain a greater understanding of the nature
and functioning of language. Just as legal practitioners defer to
expert witnesses when it comes to such things as fingerprinting and
analyzing genetic information, legal practitioners could similarly
defer to experts who can testify about language meaning. The
potential judicial adoption of interdisciplinary knowledge and
techniques from fields such as linguistics is intriguing, and the
resulting discussions from such proposals may well serve to enhance
both the theory and practice of legal interpretation.

211. Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1338 n.140 (1979).
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